1 which held that federal legislation preempted Massachusetts' restrictions on public purchases from companies doing business with Burma, have been fairly typical for high-stakes litigation: the victorious plaintiffs, eager to vindicate their prosecution of a highly controversial test case, emphasized the decision's value as precedent for future cases, 2 while Massachusetts' supporters, looking for * Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. Harvard, J.D. Yale. I benefited from comments by Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Mike Ramsey, and Peter Spiro, and from panel discussions at the annual meetings of the American Society of International Law.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) . Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a separate concurrence that differed principally on methodological grounds. Id. at 2302; see infra at text accompanying notes 5, 98.
2. Daniel O'Flaherty, vice president of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), conceded the public relations hazards of siding with the Burmese government, but explained that "'we were testing the principle of subfederal units' to influence foreign policy." James Risen, Trade Ruling Is Victory for Oil Giant, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2000, at A23. Frank Kittridge, the NFTC's president, claimed that "the Supreme Court's decision . . . reaffirms the federal government's predominant role in foreign policy and should help put an end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy. " latitude to address other human rights pariahs, instead stressed Crosby's narrow compass. 3 What's more striking are the pains the decision took to minimize its own import, so much so as to obscure why the Court granted certiorari in the first place. The First Circuit had also enjoined the Massachusetts law on the grounds that it interfered with the federal government's foreign affairs power and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 4 giving the Supreme Court the chance to resolve the important question of when, if ever, state foreign-relations activities are constitutional. By affirming solely on Burma-specific preemption grounds, however, the Court unanimously collapsed on the narrowest and least universal basis for its result -elaborating to such an extent on the particular legislative context as to provoke Justice Scalia's objection that the majority was wasting space. 5 Early academic commentary, understandably, claims that Crosby had little or no significance beyond Burma 6 -or, as a subsequent case put it, was limited to circumstances in gave the state a bit of a head start over the federal government, but Congress and the executive branch had already been considering sanctions for some time, and three months later enacted a comprehensive federal measure -one conspicuously omitting any reference to existing state and local measures.
10
Even beforehand, the Massachusetts law raised obvious, if unresolved, issues of foreign relations federalism. The orthodox approach had relegated state activities touching on foreign relations to a constitutional nether world. A long line of Supreme Court dicta 11 and academic commentary 12 attributed to the federal government a monopoly on foreign relations, but without the firm basis in text or precedent that might have established a self-enforcing principle. In fact, the national government tolerated considerable state and local deviance, in the form of regulations, resolutions, and economic and diplomatic relations. on occasion -most notably, in Zschernig v. Miller 14 -a court would conclude that a particular state activity interfered intolerably with federal prerogatives. A strong case might be made for the unconstitutionality of the Massachusetts legislation under this standard, though Zschernig was notoriously unclear as to whether foreign effects by themselves were sufficient to resolve a state law's constitutionality.
15
A second approach, which I have argued hews more closely to constitutional text, case law, and political practices, considers state and local activities touching on foreign relations unconstitutional only to the extent that they interfere with the "dormant treaty power"-the Treaty Clause's implied preemption of state bargaining with foreign powers. 16 Under this approach, states are free to declaim on matters of foreign relations, enact Buy American laws, or tax multinationals, regardless of the hue and cry from foreign nations, so long as they do not conflict with federal enactments (such as statutes or treaties) or appear contingent in fact upon the behavior of foreign powers. Even state bargaining is permissible to the extent consistent with the treaty power's externality and collective action rationales -say, were a state entering into a simple purchase agreement with a foreign country, or a municipality forging a sister city relationship -or where Congress or the President deems it unobjectionable. 17 The Massachusetts law, however, would be regarded as an unconstitutional attempt to treat with the Burmese government, since maintaining the law was unambiguously contingent on the continuation of the existing government and its repressive policies. Whatever the relative merits of these approaches, the orthodoxy lost ground to the revisionists in Barclays Bank, and at first blush Crosby appears to continue that trend. The Court directly addressed the foreign affairs power and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause issues only in noting that it was unnecessary to reach them given its conclusion that the Massachusetts law had been preempted. 23 The Court even declined to address whether the foreign relations context altered the normal presumption against preemption, having concluded that under any standard the state law would pose a sufficient obstacle to achieving congressional objectives.
24
The result seems to vindicate the revisionist perception that positive political enactments -principally legislation -are appropriate measures of the federal (and national) interest, and a sufficient means of avoiding state interference with it.
In any event, the Court regarded the decisive preemption question as straightforward. First, by giving the President authority to lift sanctions upon finding that Burma had made appreciable progress, ban new i nvestment by U.S. persons in the event that matters worsened, and waive sanctions if they became inconsistent with national security interests, Congress intended to afford the President "flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions against Burma" -while Massachusetts' sanctions were immediate and permanent, thereby reducing the President's economic and diplomatic leverage. Second, although Congress attempted "to steer a middle path" by imposing some sanctions and refraining from others, 25 the state law penalized types of business activities and classes of companies that Congress had exempted. Third, while Congress exhorted the President to take a "comprehensive, multila teral strategy" toward Burma, 26 state law complicated those discussions and made it difficult for the President "to speak for the nation with one voice in dealing with other governments." 27 The Court's own voice, it would appear, was confined to the subject of Burma, and there to the issue of preemption -better, some may have felt, than to have tested the Court's willingness to champion internationalism over the sovereign interests of the American states. But the Court's preemption analysis revealed constitutional preconceptions as well, and not all were hostile to federal and international interests.
III. CROSBY AND FOREIGN EFFECTS
Notwithstanding the Justices' quixotic attempts at judicial diplomacy, 28 the Rehnquist Court has tended to place little stock in international comity. 29 In some cases, like Barclays Bank, the Court has found foreign protests irrelevant to the construction of federal law; 30 in others, like Breard, it has upheld the rights of states to disregard foreign invo- 30. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-29 (1994) (concluding that foreign government protests against California tax, reflected in diplomatic notes and threats of retaliation, were irrelevant where Congress had implicitly permitted tax to be sustained); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (refusing to withhold federal jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims on international comity grounds where it was possible to conform both to U.S. and British law, even where U.K. government argued that U.S. antitrust liability was inconsistent with permissive British insurance scheme); United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (dismissing significance of objections by foreign governments to the legality of abducting their nationals). Contrast, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (holding that federal courts had the authority to e njoin the National Labor Relations Board from ordering an election f or the representation of foreign seamen aboard vessels under foreign flags, where the Board policy "aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and created international problems for our government"); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (rejecting place of injury as determinate choice-of-law principle under Jones Act on grounds that "such a rule does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their own nationals, and the effect upon our interests of our treatment of the legitimate interests of foreign nations").
cations of international law, and compounded the offense by failing to defer to the Court's international peers.
31
Measured by this standard, Crosby may seem refreshingly sensitive to foreign concerns. To be sure, the Court's preemption analysis contrasted uncomfortably with more limited concern for conflict in the i nternational setting. Justice Souter's majority opinion in Hartford Fire employed a narrow and unorthodox interpretation of the "true conflicts" warranting consideration of i nternational comity, which he considered was not even implicated "'where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.'" 32 In Crosby, in striking contrast, Justice Souter observed that "the fact that some companies may be able to comply with both sets of sanctions does not mean that the state Act is not at odds with achievement of the federal decision about the right degree of pressure to e mploy," 33 and found "imminent" conflict "when 'two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.'"
34
The unmistakable impression was that courts should guard zealously against conflicts with national regulatory objectives, but that the same degree of tension with regulations enforced by the federal government's foreign counterparts would not even present an issue worth considering.
Yet in evaluating whether the Massachusetts law conflicted with the President's statutory assignment to develop a comprehensive multila teral strategy, the Court attached weight to protests filed with the State Department by Japan, the European U nion, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and further emphasized the formal complaints by the EU and Japan before the WTO. To the Court, these disputes, coupled with the opinion of executive branch officials, were "competent and direct evidence of the frustration of congressional o bjectives by the state Act," at least where Congress had not specifically disregarded them. 35 Where Congress was of a diplomatic bent, then, it licensed the Court itself to show greater respect for foreign governments, and international tribunals, than had recently been its practice.
The Court's attempt to attribute its shift to Congress is somewhat misleading, and merits comment. Crosby derived the imperative of multilateralism from section 570(c) of the federal act, which directed the President to "seek to develop . . . a comprehensive, multilateral strategy" toward Burma, "in coordination with members of ASEAN and other countries having m ajor trading and investment interests in Burma," including the aim of promoting "a dialogue between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and democratic opposition groups within Burma."
36 But the statute's political antecedents and overall approach suggest that multila teralism was less fundamental to its operation, and certainly less preclusive, than the Court surmised. The Clinton administration and Congress finally agreed to act largely out of a perception that multilateral efforts had already failed, leaving little downside to more forward American initiatives.
37
Certainly Congress's decision to impose sanctions before the President would have any chance to lift them, let alone to pursue his charge under § 570(c), suggests that it perceived no inherent conflict between an initial salvo of sanctions and a multilateral strategy -or, one might have surmised, between preexisting state sanctions and a multila teral strategy. In its support of congressional legislation, which the Court duly cited, 120 S. Ct. at 2295 n.9, the executive branch did not emphasize its multilateral aspects, but instead described it as compatible with the administration's existing unilateral measures. 
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CROSBY AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 111 In any event, the President's ability "to devise a comprehensive, multilateral strategy" 39 seems reasonably distinct from whether foreign governments abreacted to the Massachusetts law, just as one might separate the character of the congressional initiative from how its after-the-fact multilateralism was received abroad. Quelling foreign concerns about the U.S. approach(es) can simply be part of multilateral discussions, just as accepting accolades for the U.S. strategy might be -and certainly bracing for foreign complaints can be part of the President's development of a multilateral approach. To be sure, it would be relatively difficult for the President to override unpreempted state sanctions, given the lack of a waiver provision comparable to that in the federal scheme. 40 But perhaps Congress anticipated that further legislation might be necessary to advance its cause and the contrary supposition, that multilateralism consists of persuading others to follow an unalterable U.S. template, would certainly have diminished the Court's concerns. 41 One may also question Crosby's fidelity to congressional intent in its appreciation of which foreign voices were relevant to multilateralismwhich, in other words, belonged to the Court's "international community." But Congress also expressly called for encouraging a dialogue between the Burmese government and its opposition, and that opposition was widely understood to favor all measures for discouraging foreign investmentincluding, presumably, state sanctions. 45 Other voices in the international community, moreover, regarded the Massachusetts law favorably -including the European Parliament (which opposed the Commission's decision to commence WTO proceedings) 46 and a wide range of nongovernmental organizations 47 -and the executive branch seemed to consider such players to be part of the relevant international community, 48 yet they were of no interest to the Court. The Court's distinctive appreciation of multilateralism is more than just an imperfect exercise in statutory construction. To a degree, the decision validates revisionist doubts about constitutional tests entailing similar judicial inquiries into foreign effects, 49 doubts which I tend to share.
50 But doing away with judicial review is not the only answer. By presuming interference with federal treaty functions for certain types of state activities, the dormant treaty power principle would also obviate the need to take the pulse of foreign governments; within this paradigm, indeed, foreign wailing and gnashing is assumed to be entirely consis- Crosby's emphasis on multilateralism is also consistent with the dormant treaty power in less obvious ways. State diplomacy is problematic not just because of its potential for interfering with the President's preferred multilateral tack (which, after all, the states may simulate or even assist, as Massachusetts contended), 52 but also because the states are themselves incapable of comprehensive multilateralism: by and large, they still lack the international standing to participate in most multila teral discourse and to resolve differences through binding international agreements. 53 Their participation, in consequence, is much more likely to be unilateral, coercive, and antagonistic. As explained in the next section, the Court's emphasis on multilateral interactions solely with "foreign powers," classically understood, rather than the full range of parties participating in modern international affairs, bespeaks a constitutional solicitude toward the President's constitutional authority over formal foreign relations.
IV. CROSBY AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The majority o pinion in Crosby cited foreign protests not for their own sake, but as relevant to the President's ability to discharge his statutory duties, 54 and toward that end emphasized executive branch statements that the Massachusetts law "has complicated its dealings with foreign sovereigns and proven an impediment to accomplishing the objectives assigned by Congress." 55 In Barclays Bank, the Court had given such representations the back of its hand. But Crosby distinguished that as an instance in which Congress had "taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of foreign governments . . . and the Executive" by failing to outlaw controversial state tax practices. As previously noted, Crosby professed to avoid any constitutional basis for its decision, other than the Supremacy Clause. But in two of three bases the Court proffered for preemption, it went out of its way to explain that the power at stake was constitutional, and presidential, in origin. In discussing the tension between the rigid Massachusetts law and the federal act's flexibility, for example, the Court invoked not only Justice Jackson's view that a President's authority is greatest when congressional delegation supplements "all that he possesses in his own right," 57 but also Jackson's observation that "the President's power in the area of foreign relations is least restricted by Congress" 58 -and further cited Curtiss-Wright, the bête noire of those defending congressional prerogatives. 59 The constitutional component to the multilateralism argument was still clearer. In stressing that " Congress's express command to the President to take the initiative for the United States among the international community invested him with the maximum authority of the National Government," 60 the Court also noted that such authority was "in harmony with the President's own constitutional powers," citing the treaty power and the powers to appoint and receive ambassadors. 61 The Court further invoked the President's constitutional authority in alluding to Dames & Moore v. Regan, which bespoke a healthy respect for the President's authority to settle claims, 62 and in referring to the "foreign powers" that are the objects of the treaty power. 63 The Court even acknowledged, it seemed, that Congress's mandate for multilateralism provided the President with no authority (and, for that matter, no enforceable constraint) other than that already conferred by the Constitu- tion, observing that the federal act was both a "clear mandate" and an "invocation of exclusive national power." 64 The difficulty lies in assessing when that exclusive national power, be it statutory or otherwise, has been frustrated -which in turn involves the delicate question of how to square judicial intervention with respect for the relevant political branches. In this regard, too, the Court was more accommodating of the executive branch than was previously its practice. 65 Although t he Court dutifully acknowledged both congressional and executive-branch competence on foreign policy, 66 Crosby was relatively respectful of the President's role -certainly as compared to Barclays Bank, which dismissed executive-branch objections to California's tax as irrelevant once Congress, "the preeminent speaker," had passed within shouting distance. 67 The Court differentiated between the legal judgments of the executive, to which it would not "unquestionably" defer on preemption questions, and the practical assessment by officials of real-world difficulties occasioned by the state law. As to the la tter, the Court confessed, t he judiciary is far less competent than the political branches to "determin[e] precisely when foreign nations will be o ffended by particular acts" 68 or to perceive the "nuances" of U.S. foreign policy. 69 The resulting deference to the executive branch was not only more generous than in Barclays Bank, but also exceeded that in Zschernig v. Miller, where the Court essentially decided to evaluate foreign policy by itself.
70
The trick with deference, of course, lies in knowing when to stop, particularly given its predicate that judges are inexpert at assessing the relevant evidence. Crosby winds up being a cautionary tale. Consistent with its minimalist approach, the Court provided little guidance on the sorts of evidence that might substantiate a conflict, besides concluding that "[i]n this case, repeated representations by the executive branch supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes are more than sufficient" to demonstrate interference with congressional obje c-VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF The Court properly avoided prejudging the merits of the WTO proceedings, 73 but was then left with the difficult task of translating diffuse evidence of political conflict into something legally relevant; in attempting to do so, it ignored evidence suggesting a considerably more n uanced (if not Janus-faced) official position on the Massachusetts law and its legality. The United States was not, after all, legally bound to defend Massachusetts before the WTO 74 -particularly not if it perceived that the state was violating federal law as well -and it initially declined to take any clear position, 75 beyond cautioning the EU to let it first deal with the matter internally.
76
When this failed, however, the U.S. Trade Representative not only expressed "regret" at the WTO consultations, but also flung back the European Parliament's opposition to WTO proceedings and Member State encouragement of similar state sanctions. 77 The Secretary of State also reported that she and the President "recognize[d] the authority of state and local officials to determine their own investment and procurement policies, and the right -indeed their responsibility -to take moral considerations into account as they do so." Prior to September 1998, when the EU finally elected to ask for a dispute resolution panel, it was not clear whether it would press the matter, or what the U.S. reaction would be. 80 Unless one dismisses this all as posturing (and assumes that it were possible to discern a more accurate account), it raises a credible argument that foreign conflicts were not an inevitable byproduct of the Massachusetts law, but were instead the result of a U.S. decision to take up the state's defense -perhaps based on a belief that Massachusetts was within its rights -and overreactions by Europe and Japan. 81 In any event, these were not the sounds of officials convinced that Massachusetts was undermining a congressionally dictated objective, and few if any of the statements cited by the Court support that proposition either. 82 Crosby suggested that the Solicitor General "continue[d] to advance" the theory that state sanctions conflicted with congressional obje ctives, 83 but that theory was still nascent, and it was even unclear up until the merits stage in the Supreme Court whether the United States would side with or against Massachusetts. 84 ing with Massachusetts, and with other state and local governments which have implemented or are considering the imposition of various sanctions measures, to try to ensure that they are designed so that they do not conflict with our international obligations and work to advance rather than retard progress toward meeting our foreign policy objectives.").
79. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 77. Secretary of State Albright, speaking more generally, urged state and localities to work "in partnership" with the State Department to ensure compliance with international obligations and to maintain a consistent voice in foreign policy. Albright, supra note 77.
80. See Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S. Vows to Defend Sanctions by State, J. COM., Sept. 11, 1998, at 3A; see also Michael S. Lelyveld, Anti-Sanctions Forces Win Key Vote, J. COM., Aug. 1, 1998, at 1A (noting failure of House bill designed to protect Massachusetts from suit to enforce WTO panel decisions, and noting uncertainty surrounding whether the federal government would seek to force compliance by Massachusetts, despite pledges by U.S.T.R. spokesperson that the federal government would defend Massachusetts before the WTO).
81. Drawing such a distinction would, of course, be fraught with peril: not only would it be difficult for courts to distinguish between genuine and manufactured executive branch expressions, but any such distinction would risk privileging unexamined foreign reactions. See supra text accompanying note 44 (describing problem of the "heckler's veto").
82. The only remarks directly alluding to the federal statute opined that the Massachusetts law was "very different." See Alan P. Larson, Assistant Secretary of State, State and Local Sanctions: Remarks to the Council of State Governments (Dec. 8, 1998) (on file with author). It is noteworthy that those remarks were delivered over six months after the initiation of the lawsuit against Massachusetts, and that over a year passed before the executive branch officials again took that position. See also infra note 87 (describing other executive branch testimony). The Court's reductionist appraisal of this hubbub is again supportive in some respects of foreign-relations revisionism. Revisionists are skeptical not only of the quality of judicial judgments in their own right, but also of the legitimacy and authority of the executive branch guidance submitted to them. 85 The Burma controversy also casts further doubt on any orthodox fiction that the federal government could, even left to its own devices, manage to maintain "one voice" in foreign affairs. The diversity of subjects, actors, and interests in modern global affairs means that even "sovereign" actors need to maintain multiple (and sometimes conflicting) networks and dialogues, particularly where domestic and international law point in different directions. 86 Deciding when to insist on a single voice, it may be argued, is a task best left to Congress.
But if Crosby is troubling for the administration of any "one voice" orthodoxy, it almost equally bedevils any revisionist preference for statutory analysis. The Court's difficulties in Crosby, after all, lay in evaluating alleged conflicts between state activities and congressional (not constitutional) objectives, and there is no reason to think that such inquiries are ordinarily any easier in kind. The two may in fact be difficult to distinguish: the President's actual obje ctives in any particular situation are invariably independent to some degree of congressional stipulation -a host of solutions, for example, might be both multilateral and generally conducive to Burmese democracy and human rights -and even Congress likely expects that pursuit of those objectives will accord with the President's broader constitutional responsibility for promoting the n ational interest. In Crosby itself, the senior executive officials cited by the Court made little or no mention of statutory objectives, but instead tended to couch their objections to state interference in terms of conflict with the President's constitutional responsibility for foreign policy. To the extent these objections implicated the S upremacy Clause, they related to t he potential for violating international, not domestic, enactments. 87 Following the revisionists in deferring almost exclusively to Congress would also be inconsistent with Crosby's apparent respect for executive authority. While purposefully stopping short of d elimiting state authority respecting foreign affairs, the Court also deliberately transcended the statutory mission designated by Congress by invoking "the very capacity of the President to speak with one voice in dealing with other governments." 88 To the Court, it was self-evident that "the President's maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics."
89
Congress clearly possessed the authority to eliminate any such e nclave, 90 but the Court considered it equally beyond controversy that the mere ability to override state law did not suffice to protect the exclusive national power. -474) ; accord Eizenstat, Letter to the Editor, supra note 37, at 155 (citing Clinton Administration concern with state sanctions, and noting that "although Congress clearly has a role to play, the President is the sole custodian of the implementation of foreign policy and must be given the opportunity to speak for the nation as a whole").
This potential for confusion surely undermines the Court's attempt to differentiate between deference to executive branch officials on legal questions, which the Court would not "unquestioningly" extend, and those officials' "competence to show the practical difficulty of pursuing a congressional goal requiring multinational agreement." Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301. Evidence of conflict or encroachment will tend to be predicated upon an underlying theory of entitlement. Unless executive branch testimony is highly specific, and properly interpreted, deferring on a question of practical impact may involve accepting a particular legal theory as well.
88 Finally, revisionism is hardly the only solution. A narrower constitutional principle, like the dormant treaty power, might presumptively proscribe certain state conduct without requiring e xecutive submission or other specific protest, i nstead relying on a backdrop of executivebranch constitutional authority. Such a principle, likewise, does not depend on the fiction that one voice can be maintained in all matters of foreign affairs, but instead insists that only one authority -the President -engage in the more defined role of bargaining with foreign powers.
Insisting on the pertinence of executive authority is not, it turns out, as radical as it may seem. Those favoring the orthodox federal monopoly, or the narrower prohibition on state bargaining with foreign powers, ordinarily concede Congress's general authority to license state foreign-relations activities, just like it may consent to foreign compacts or agreements other than treaties. 91 The constitutional question, instead, is what rules ought govern in the absence of congressional intervention: a constitutional prohibition, given executive-branch prerogatives, or a more permissive approach, one respecting the presumptive authority of state governments. When Congress does act, as it did toward Burma, the answer to t his constitutional question remains pertinent, informing how the j udiciary approaches the statute -and, as Crosby cautions, how Congress regards the judic iary.
V. CROSBY AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL AFFAIRS
This constitutional subtext to Crosby -its extra-statutory solicitude for formal diplomatic interaction with foreign powers, and for the President's presumptively exclusive ability to engage in it -is, after all, only subtext: the Court's explicit basis for decision was statutory, and so limited to the Burma legislation. Even so, Crosby's approach to statutory construction may have profound implications for the future of state foreign-relations conduct. Here, too, the Court disclaimed any interest in painting with broad strokes. Contrasting its decision earlier in the term in United States v. Locke, which held that the normal presumption against preemption was inappropriate in matters of national and international maritime commerce, 92 the Court held that the clarity of the conflict between the Massachusetts and federal legislation allowed it to 91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from "enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (allowing states to enter into an "Agreement or Compact" with a foreign power, if so permitted by Congress). There are limits to this authority, of course, but they may pose no more of a constraint than those on any assertion of authority by Congress -for example, its inability to nominate and appoint ambassadors on its own behalf.
92. 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1147-48 (2000).
"leave for another day a consideration in this context of a presumption against preemption."
93
The Court's coyness preserves its right to upset some future statutory scheme based on a hitherto undisclosed ground rule. But Crosby also contains seeds of two biases that may signal difficulty for states interested in foreign affairs. The first, already forecast, may be an inclination to read statutes as consistent with executive branch constitutional prerogatives, such as the unfettered authority to negotiate with foreign powers on the nation's behalf. 94 The precise scope of any such presumption, not a complete stranger to foreign affairs, 95 may now to have to await a purely constitutional decision, and then another statutory matter in its wake, to the eventual surprise of both Congress and the states.
The Court's treatment of legislative history may also have effected a kind of presumption. The Court summarily rejected Massachusetts' argument that Congress's failure expressly to preempt its law demonstrated implicit permission, stressing that Congress may have been relying on the courts to detect and resolve any i nconsistency between federal and state law.
96
This agnosticism is deeply at odds with Barclays Bank, which concluded that silence in the face of discrepant state law connoted congressional acceptance (and, correspondingly, rejection of foreign and executive branch objections).
97
Equally striking, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the majority's view that "the silence of Congress may be ambiguous" was inconsistent with its argument that Congress's failure to enact variant schemes resembling the Massachusetts law meant that state law was preempted. 98 The result, all told, is 98. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring); compare id. at 2302 (noting ambiguity of congressional silence), with id. at 2296 n.11, 2297 n.13, 2301 n.23 (discussing legislative history). Justice Scalia did not go so far, however, as to endorse the approach he thought the Court had betrayed. Cf. Johnson v. Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that congressional inaction may result from any number of reasons: "(1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice").
one to inspire caution. Crosby has been read as encouraging lobbyists for the states and human rights to focus on securing exemptions from federal sanctions legislation.
99
Should their efforts fall short, however, Crosby also suggests that the fact of that failure may be cited against them and in favor of preemption.
A de facto presumption of preemption would accomplish some part of what a constitutionally-premised bar on state diplomacy might, by encouraging the collective, national formulation of foreign policy, even as to the desirability of exemptions for state policies. Yet a preemptionbased analysis, shorn of a clearer constitutional premise, would have a distinctive side effect. Executive branch officials, and an increasing proportion of Congress, have come to agree with America's trading partners that its penchant for unilateral sanctions is often counterproductive. Sanctions often have an extraterritorial effect on parties other than the target, and when they do not, may simply permit investment substitution from other countries lacking in restrictions. Multilateral support, in consequence, is increasingly seen as a prerequisite for American sanctions.
100
Left to its statutory basis, Crosby perversely invites the opposite strategy. If Congress desires to maintain federal control of a particular topic for foreign diplomacy, it is asked to choose between establishing an affirmative, identifiable federal policy with preemptive effect, on the one hand, and the rarely palatable option of passing legislation with t he sole purpose of snuffing out state activities, on the other. 101 One may regard the core of this dilemma, the idea that the federal government must make policy in order to prevent state policy-making, as one of those conundrums routine to a federal society, at least in one in which 99 . See Morning Edition, supra note 3 ("[I]n the future, when questions of human rights arise in Congress, state and local governments will be asking Congress to include some kind of savings clause in legislation that would permit state and local governments to continue to act in this way"); Goldberg, supra note 9; Greenhouse, supra note 6. the judiciary minds its own business. It gives pause, however, to consider the serious impact this has on the possibilities for multilateralism, the apparent obje ctive behind the legislation at issue in Crosby itself. If Congress is routinely forced to choose between establishing a federal program, solely barring state policies, and tolerating state interference, it may find it impossible to achieve the state of repose most conducive to international policy coordination. Securing that state of repose, I argue in the final section, requires the Court's own construction of the Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION AS A LAST RESORT
Crosby's crux lies not in its reading of the federal Burma law or its approach to preemption, but rather in its prudential approach to rendering decisions -evidenced by its terse invocation of Justice Brandeis's famous caution in Ashwander v. TVA against unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions.
102
The reasons for electing this approach d eserved greater elaboration. 103 The most common rationale involves the respect owed by courts to the coordinate branches, particularly in the corollary that courts should construe a statute so as to avoid potential conflict with the Constitution. 104 That corollary itself is plainly inapposite in Crosby -given that the propriety of the federal statute was not in question 105 -and respect for Congress seems only remotely relevant to any more general notion of constitutional avoidance. Avoiding deciding on the basis of a constitutional ground that is facially consistent with a federal legislative scheme involves little in the way of deference, unless one imagines that the political branches insist on top billing for their efforts.
106
Avoidance is also commended by the need for self-restraint in exercising the "delicate" and "final" function of judicial review, caution animated by many of the same concerns for avoiding encroachment on the political branches. 107 But those arguments are far less persuasive in the context of a "dormant" constitutional authority, 108 and a less selfobsessed respect for the separation of powers might have warranted embracing the constitutional questions posed by Crosby. In failing to address directly the foreign a ffairs power question with which it was properly presented -on one of the few occasions it has had to clarify the confusion wrought by Zschernig -the Court essentially confirmed the impression that Congress was the more certain vehicle for resolving federal-state foreign policy conflicts. As previously noted, there were also strong hints of executive authority, and the time may yet come when the Court is forced to clarify that authority's preemptive effect (or, for that matter, the preemptive effect of the dormant Commerce Clause, or that of the Senate's responsibilities under the Treaty Clause). In the interim, though, the President may be forgiven for concluding that statutory preemption is a far safer course, and for taking pains to avoid litigating a case solely on the basis of dormant constitutional authority. In Crosby, the Court might have affirmed the President's authority without diminishing that of Congress or the Senate, 109 and its failure to resolve the question entailed a shift of power from the President to Congressacquiescence that the Court may eventually consider probative of constitutional meaning. 110 Federalism concerns might be the clearer argument for avoidance, 111 but here too matters are less clear than they might seem. To be sure, confirming the monopoly orthodoxy or a dormant treaty power would leave less authority in the first i nstance to the states, and the Court's rule instead places the burden on the federal government to intervene. 112 One may wonder, though, whether such an approach really avoids prejudging the point at i ssue. 113 If, for example, the Constitution precludes state bargaining with foreign powers absent federal permission, the fundamental objective of the principle may be lost if courts are unwilling to enforce it without waiting for political intervention. Constitutional forbearance may, in other words, inflict constitutional harm, and not just in the sense of leaving interesting questions undecided.
Crosby reminds us, therefore, that the warrant for judicial minimalism "is not separable from an evaluation of the underlying substantive controversies" 114 or, for that matter, from its institutional context. This deserves special attention in the foreign relations context. Invoking Ashwander lets the political branches (and the states) operate unfettered by the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution -creating lacunae, in other words, for independent lawmaking. 115 But these lacunae, and this independence, are not so easily maintained in the international sphere. Passages in Crosby demonstrate the Court's understanding that U.S. foreign relations law is forged in part by the i nteraction between the political branches and foreign powers, and that the effectiveness of this interaction in securing U.S. objectives may be influenced by the p olitic al branches' domestic authority. What the Court fails to acknowledge is the degree to which uncertainty over those prerogatives can equally affect outcomes, and -crucially -how international law and policy will continue to be forged even in the absence of effective U.S. participation. Foreign powers will undoubtedly continue to devote energies to Capitol Hill, and the statehouses, as well as to formal diplomatic channels. And where those audiences do not converge, and their authority is obscure, other nations can and should take the lead in establishing international norms that may touch on U.S. interests. It may be hoped that the Court will recognize that diplomacy is as delicate and, potentially, final, as its own authority, and see fit to overcome Crosby's reticence by conforming U.S. foreign relations law more clearly to the Constitution's dictates. 115 . To be sure, the invitation to state lawmaking is not so great as if the Court had ruled in their favor, particularly given the (waning) shadow cast by Zschernig. But it is abundantly clear that the states are not substantially deterred by the uncertainty. But see The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 354-59 (assuming that lingering doubts will deter subnational legislation touching on foreign affairs).
